Face anti-spoofing problem can be quite challenging due to various factors including diversity of face spoofing attacks, any new means of spoofing, the problem of imaging sensor interoperability and other environmental factors in addition to the small sample size. Taking into account these observations, in this work, first, a new evaluation protocol called "innovative attack evaluation protocol" to study the effect of occurrence of unseen attack types is proposed which better reflects the realistic conditions in spoofing attacks. Second, a new formulation of the problem based on the anomaly detection concept is proposed where the training data comes from the positive class only. The test data, of course, may come from the positive or negative class. Finally, a thorough evaluation and comparison of 20 different one-class and two-class systems is performed and demonstrated that the anomaly-based formulation is not inferior as compared with the conventional two-class approach.
Introduction
Spoofing attacks are known to pose a challenge to the deployment of biometrics systems and face recognition algorithms are no exception. In a spoofing scenario, an imposter tries to get illegal access to a service by presenting artificial biometrics traits of a registered subject. These typically include print attacks, and replay attacks.
The common approach to detecting spoofing attacks is to collect both real and fake data (spoofing attempts) and then try to learn a suitable two-class classifier to predict whether a test sample is a real access or a spoofing attempt. However, despite the great progress made in this direction [8, 26, 14, 30, 16] , there are certain drawbacks to this approach. First of all, while all the real-access data are assumed to be ideally of the same nature, the spoofing attacks can potentially be very diverse. In other words, the data which represent the negative class (spoofing attack) does not necessarily form a compact region in the chosen representation space. This can be due to, for example, different media used for spoofing attempts such as printed photo attack or video replay attack. The resulting multimodality of spoofing attack data hinders learning an effective decision boundary between the positive and negative samples. Second, augmenting the training set with more samples to improve classification performance in such two-class schemes is not easy as both real access and fake data are required. In particular, collecting data corresponding to spoofing attacks is labour intensive and hence limited in number. On the other hand, increasing the number of samples only in the positive set would result in imbalanced training data and may not be as effective as expected in improving the classification performance. Third, attackers may come up with new and inventive ways of spoofing which were not previously seen during the training phase. Thus, regardless of the database used for training, the negative training samples may not be representative of all potential spoofing attacks. As a result, the learned two-class classifiers in these situations do not always appropriately generalise to accommodate such unseen test data in the operation phase. Therefore, frequent spoofing signature updates are required. Moreover, most of the time, one is not interested in identifying the source of a spoofing attack (e.g. whether the attacker has used a printed photograph or a video screen to spoof a face recognition system is irrelevant in the current context) but merely detecting its occurrence. The diversity of imaging sensors and the sensor inter-operability problem and other environmental conditions when added to the aforementioned undesirable factors, pose serious challenges in detection of spoofing attempts.
Motivated by the aforementioned observations, the current work formulates face anti-spoofing as a one-class pattern recognition problem where only normal (real-access) data is used for training. Compared to the existing two-class approaches for face spoofing detection, the proposed oneclass framework has appealing characteristics as follows. First, as only the positive (normal) samples are used for building the model, the undesirable effects of the diversity of spoofing data on detection performance is minimised. This is based on the assumption that all the real access (normal) data are more or less similar in nature. Second, in order to improve system performance one may more easily extend the training data. This is due to the fact that only real-access data are required for training. Third, an anomaly detectionbased system potentially has the ability to detect previously unknown attacks due to the fact that the constructed model in such an approach is not based on specific signatures representing spoofing attempts. Rather, the system would flag an observation as anomaly (spoofing attempt) only when it deviates from the normal data (real access attempts) and not because the system has faced a known spoofing attack signature.
In terms of the evaluation protocol, the current work proposes a more realistic approach for performance evaluation. Currently, the existing databases and the associated evaluation protocols do not have the potential to accurately predict system behaviour in realistic conditions as a result of at least two disturbing factors. The first deficiency results from the nature of the anomalies for which a globally comprehensive model may be very difficult, if not impossible, to construct. This owes to the fact that different subjects may come up with new and inventive ways of producing anomalous data for spoofing attempts which were not previously captured by the negative samples of the database used in the training phase. This particular aspect of evaluation is quite important in order to construct a reliable system for practical usage which is missing in the evaluation schemes of the current data sets. The second drawback of the existing evaluation protocols is the lack of accounting for sensor interoperability and some other environmental changes in spoofing detection. The representations used for classification purposes may vary undesirably as a result of using different imaging sensors and other undesired variations in imaging conditions during the training and operational phases which may lead to deterioration in system performance. In this respect, in the new evaluation protocol, both inter-database and intra-database evaluations are incorporated to take into account the variability in imaging sensor and some other environmental conditions. The new evaluation protocol proposed in this work addresses the aforementioned concerns, to be discussed in the subsequent sections. For the assessment of the proposed anomaly-based spoofing detection mechanism under the new evaluation protocol a thorough examination and comparison of 20 different one-class and two-class systems is performed.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature on existing face spoofing detection methods. In Section 3, once a description of the employed representations is provided, the anomaly detection mechanisms examined are presented. In Section 4, after giving a brief description of the databases used, the new inter-and intra-database cross-type evaluation settings are presented. The discussion is then followed by an overview of the oneclass and two-class systems evaluated and a discussion of the results of their extensive evaluation on the three benchmark databases in various scenarios. Finally, conclusions are drawn in Section 5.
Related Work
The existing approaches to spoofing detection operate by training the system using both real access and spoofing data. The differences largely lie in the representations used for modelling real vs. spoofing attempts. Categorisation of existing approaches based on the employed cues has been performed in a recent study [8] where they are broadly classified into three major groups.
The first group comprises methods based on detecting different signs of vitality [19] , [20] , [26] . The second group of methods are those which are based on the differences in motion patterns between real and spoofing attacks. These approaches mainly rely on the fact that the spoofing media are often flat 2D planes whereas real accesses correspond to 3D structures. Moreover, it has been assumed that motion in spoofing attacks is rigid whereas both rigid and non-rigid motion is present in real-access attempts [5] , [17] , [4] , [1] . The last category of face liveness detection methods relies on image distortion/quality measures [15] , [31] , [23] , [16] , [12] , [21] , [14] .
Some other works require special hardware during image capture for spoofing detection. The work in [22] is one such method illuminating the face during image capture and using the reflected colour from the face as a means of image watermarking. In [28] , image distortion is modelled as four different features of specular reflection, blurriness, chromatic moment, and colour diversity. The work in [18] investigates suitable convolutional network architectures and tries to learn the weights of the network. In [3] the detection of spoofing is attempted via a combination of LPQ-TOP [33, 11] and BSIF-TOP [2] features. The fusion of multiple sources of information is accomplished via a fast kernel discriminant analysis approach using spectral regression.
While most of the existing methods try to learn a general classifier to delineate spoofing attempts from real access data, the work in [30] proposes a method using a classifier specifically trained for each subject. In a similar attempt, the work in [7] studied the client-specific information embedded in the feature space and its effects on the performance of the system. Using both texture and motion cues, the authors built two anti-spoofing methods, one being a generative approach while the other being a discriminative method.
Methodology
The current work approaches face spoofing detection problem from an anomaly detection perspective. For this purpose, different one-class models are used to detect anomalous patterns (outliers). The assumption here is that spoofing attempts can potentially be much more diverse in the chosen representation space compared to normal (real access) data instances. A data instance is labelled as an anomaly if it does not belong to the normal class representing real accesses. In this work, we make use of some the most commonly employed descriptors for face spoofing detection. In the remainder of this section, we briefly review the descriptors adopted for representing an image sequence and then discuss the anomaly detection mechanisms proposed in this work.
Representations Used
Since the main focus of this work is to compare the merits of the one-class and two-class classifiers in the context of the proposed innovative attack evaluation protocol, we keep other factors in the evaluation constant. In this regard and in order to model the temporal as well as spatial attributes of an image sequence, standard dynamic texture descriptors as well as image quality features are employed in the current work. For this purpose, an image sequence is modelled in three different ways: using a local binary pattern operator on three orthogonal planes (LBP-TOP) [32] ; local phase quantization on three orthogonal planes (LPQ-TOP) [33, 11] ; and binarised statistical image features on three orthogonal planes (BSIF-TOP) [2] . This choice is driven by their success in face spoofing detection. Moreover, motivated by the success of image quality measures, we use a fourth set of features, consisting of image quality measures employed in [10] .
Outlier Detection Mechanisms
A recent categorisation of anomaly detection approaches [13] considers anomaly detection methods to be of either generative or non-generative nature. While for generative models there is a transparent link between data and models, non-generative models lack a direct relationship to the data. These methods are exemplified by discriminative models which aim to identify the class identity of a pattern by partitioning the observation space. In the current work, both approaches are studied for the task of face spoofing detection. The non-generative models are represented by the one-class SVM classifier while the generative class is exemplified by a one-class sparse representation-based model to detect outliers.
Experimental Evaluation
The three databases used in the experiments are the CA-SIA FASD [31] , the Replay-Attack database [6] and the M-SU MFSD database [27] . These datasets include samples of printed attacks and video display attacks. For a detailed description of each data set the reader is referred to the relevant references. In the following section, a new evaluation protocol is presented. The discussion then focuses on the two-class and one-class systems designed for spoofing detection and the results of the experimental evaluation in different settings.
The Proposed Evaluation Protocols
The premise behind the current face spoofing detection research is that antispoofing technology can be developed by collecting spoofing attack data for various types of forgery. With a sufficient volume of spoofing data available, antispoofing solutions can then be developed by formulating the detection problem as a conventional two-class discrimination task, i.e. normal access versus spoofing attack, and adopt conventional training procedures to design a spoofing detector. The implicit assumption behind this philosopy is that the responsibility for bringing a spoofing detector technology to the market rests with an independent third party industry rather than with the biometric technology provider. In such a scenario, which we shall refer to as conventional scenario, collecting both types of samples, i.e. normal access and spoofing attack samples, is a necessary prerequisite and considered as the normal practice. The acquisition of both categories of accesses is equally difficult and for each subject participating in data collection both types can be acquired as part of the same data collection campaign.
The existing evaluation protocols in the literature [31, 6, 27] reflect this point of view. The protocols have been designed to measure the spoofing detection system performance in two basic conditions. The stable conditions scenario involves training and testing the detection systems on data within a single database where all normal and spoofing attack accesses are acquired using the same sensor set up and deploying an identical implementation of spoofing attempts. The protocol involves splitting all the data available into training and test data and guaging the true and false positive detection rates accordingly. This category of evaluation protocols is known as intra-database testing. The second category of tests measures the generalisation capability of the spoofing detection solutions developed using the data of one database for the system design on other databases. This is referred to as the inter-database testing protocol.
The above conventional evaluation protocols fail to address an extremely pertinent question. How does a spoofing detection system cope with a new type of spoofing attack. Individuals aiming to deceive biometric systems are very inventive and create new forms of attack which cannot necessarily be envisaged beforehand. In the absence of training data the spoofing attack detectors designed using the conventional two-class training approach are likely to be ineffective. To measure this capacity to detect novel forms of attack, a new protocol is required. To this effect we propose a new family of protocols, named innovative attack evaluation protocol designed to provide this crucial performance information. In essence, as the focus is on assessing the generalisation capability of various systems subject to different types of attacks, in each scenario, one attack type is excluded from the training set and presented to the system only during the test phase. The proposed experimental protocols ensure that the spoofing detection systems do not see any spoofing accesses of a new type during training. Thus for intra-database performance evaluation the systems use training data associated with two spoofing accesses plus corresponding normal access data and are then tested on the third type of attack. This is repeated in rotation for the other two types of attack and for the other two databases as well. In contrast, to evaluate the generalisation capacity of the spoofing detection systems in the inter-database testing scenario, the two-class systems are trained using normal and spoofing attack data of two databases and test on the third database. The spoofing attack data of the type tested on the third database is always excluded from training the two-class systems.
The data usage corresponding to the evaluation protocols is summarised in Table 1. In the table the symbol "+" indicates the sections of the three databases used for training, and "*" denotes the sections used for testing. For instance, in the Protocol Scenario designated as Inter-Replay AttackVideo, the two class systems are trained on normal access data in the Casia and MSU datasets, and the Warped and Cut spoofing attack data from the Casia database as well as the Printed spoofing attack from the MSU database. None of the video related spoofing attacks in Casia and MSU are used for training. The testing is performed on the normal and video spoofing attack access of the Replay database.
As already argued, in our opinion, the above conventional design scenario is not completely realistic for several reasons:
1. Biometric technology providers are commercially motivated and technologically best qualified to provide both face recognition and antispoofing technologies, potentially as part of a single integrated system. Under this assumption it is relatively easy to collect biometric access data and extract from it measurements relevant for spoofing attack detection.
2. Normal access data can be collected with relative ease whereas spoofing attack data requires simulating the various forms of attack which is demanding in terms of manpower resources.
Accordingly, a more realistic scenario promulgated in this paper is to formulate the spoofing detection problem as one of anomaly detection where spoofing is viewed as an outlier of the learnt distribution of a spoofing test statistic which is based on some features extracted from video access information collected for genuine users. The assumption is that any spoofing attack will be distinguishable from normal accesses based on this test statistic. In complience with this new philosophy to spoofing attack detector design, only normal access data is required for training, and the detection engine is based on the one-class classification approach. The aim of this paper is to investigate the performance of spoofing detectors based on this one-class classifier technique and their ability to detect spoofing attacks regardless of the type. As the design of one-class systems is based on much less training data (normal accesses only) than that used for their two-class counterparts, their performance measured using conventional evaluation protocols can be expected to be inferior. However, their ability to detect unknown spoofing attacks could be better than that of two-class systems, as in essence one-class systems aim to encapsulate the normal access data and any deviations from the norm, including novel departures should be detectable. The experimental protocol for testing one-class spoofing detection systems is very simple. They are trained using normal access training data only. In the intra-database scenario the decision making systems are trained using the normal access training data available in one of the spoofing databases. Their performance is measured using the normal access test data, and spoofing attack test data of the same database. The detection rate for each type of spoofing attack is measured separately. This experiment is repeated for each of the three databases. In the inter-database evaluation we train one-class classifier systems using normal access training data from two databases, and test on the normal access and spoofing access test data of the third database. The performance for each type of attack is recorded separately. The process is repeated for each spoofing attack type and then for each spoofing database.
It should be reiterated that the one-class systems examined in this work do not use negative training data (spoofing attacks). Only the two class systems employ such data.
Two-class Systems
The two-class systems evaluated are constructed using a two-class SVM with a radial basis function, the two-class LDA classifier and the sparse representation-based twoclass classifier. For the LDA-based systems, a PCA transformation is initially applied to the data in order to make the within-class scatter matrix invertible. For the sparserepresentation-based classifier, the Homotopy algorithm is used [9] . In these systems, both real accesses as well as spoofing attacks are used for training a classifier. In particular, the following systems are evaluated:
• SVM2+BSIF-TOP: The two-class SVM classifier with a Gaussian kernel trained using the multi-scale BSIF-TOP features.
• SVM2+LPQ-TOP: The two-class SVM classifier with a Gaussian kernel trained using the multi-scale LPQ-TOP features.
• SVM2+LBP-TOP: The two-class SVM classifier with a Gaussian kernel trained using the multi-scale LBP-TOP features.
• SVM2+IMQ: The two-class SVM classifier with a Gaussian kernel trained using the image quality features.
• LDA2+BSIF-TOP: The two-class LDA classifier trained using the multi-scale BSIF-TOP representations.
• LDA2+LPQ-TOP: The two-class LDA classifier trained using the multi-scale LPQ-TOP representations.
• LDA2+LBP-TOP: The two-class LDA classifier trained using the multi-scale LBP-TOP representations.
• LDA2+IMQ: The two-class LDA classifier trained using image quality features.
• SRC2+BSIF-TOP: The two-class sparse representation-based classifier trained using the multi-scale BSIF-TOP representations.
• SRC2+LPQ-TOP: The two-class sparse representation-based classifier trained using the multi-scale LPQ-TOP representations.
• SRC2+LBP-TOP: The two-class sparse representation-based classifier trained using the multi-scale LBP-TOP representations.
• SRC2+IMQ: The two-class sparse representation-based classifier trained using image quality features.
One-class Systems
As noted earlier, the systems evaluated for anomaly detection in this work are based on the one-class SVM [24] and the sparse representation-based classifier [29] . In particular, the following systems are evaluated for one-class anomaly detection:
• SVM1+BSIF-TOP: The one-class SVM with a Gaussian kernel trained using the multi-scale BSIF-TOP features.
• SVM1+LPQ-TOP: The one-class SVM with a Gaussian kernel trained using the multi-scale LPQ-TOP features.
• SVM1+LBP-TOP: The one-class SVM with a Gaussian kernel trained using the multi-scale LBP-TOP features.
• SVM1+IMQ: The one-class SVM with a Gaussian kernel trained using the image quality features.
• SRC1+BSIF-TOP: The sparse representation-based one-class classifier trained using the multi-scale BSIF-TOP features.
• SRC1+LPQ-TOP: The sparse representation-based one-class classifier trained using the multi-scale LPQ-TOP features.
• SRC1+LBP-TOP: The sparse representation-based one-class classifier trained using the multi-scale LBP-TOP features.
• SRC1+IMQ: The sparse representation-based one-class classifier trained using the image quality features.
Evaluation results for the Intra-database & cross-type setting
The one-class and two-class systems introduced earlier are evaluated on the three databases of CASIA, ReplayAttack and MSU in the intra-database & cross-type setting for a total of 9 different evaluations. As noted earlier, in this experiment, since the training and test data come from the same database, the focus here is on the effect of the type of spoofing media on the system performance. In this setting, two types of tests are performed: whole image test and the face region test. In the whole image test, each frame of a video sequence is used as a whole for extracting features whereas in the face region test, only the face region in each frame is used to construct the feature vector. The results of this experiment are reported in Tables 2, 3 and 4 for the CASIA, Replay-Attack and MSU datasets, respectively. The performance of different systems is summarised using mean and standard deviation of area under the ROC curves in Table 5 . In the tables, "w" denotes a whole image test whereas "f" stands for a face region test. Examining Tables  2, 3 and 4 reveals that in general, in the intra-database & cross-type setting, the systems operating on the whole image perform better than the systems operating on the face region only. This is intuitive as in the intra-database setting the background remains almost the same and can be exploited to improve performance.
As can be seen from Table 5 , the best performing two-class system in terms of average performance is SR-C2+BSIF(w) with an average AUC of 92.51%. The best performing method among the one-class systems is SR-C1+BSIF(w) with an average AUC of 90.77%. The average performance of the best performing one-class method in this case is only less than 2% worse than the best performing two-class approach.
If one restricts the attention only to the systems operating on the face region, the best performing two-class approach is SVM2+LPQ(f) with an average AUC of 81.53% whereas the best performing one-class method in this case is SR-C1+IMQ(f) with an average performance of 87.84% which is more than 6% better than the two-class alternative. These observations clearly illustrate the potential of the one-class anomaly detection approach in the challenging conditions of cross-type evaluations.
Evaluation results for the Inter-database & cross-type setting
In this section, the one-class and two-class systems introduced earlier are evaluated on the three databases of CASI-A, Replay-Attack and MSU in the inter-database & crosstype setting for a total of 9 different evaluation schemes. The results of this experiment are reported in Table 6 and also summarised as mean and standard deviations of area under the ROC curves in Table 7 . As can be seen from Table 7, in this experiment, similar to the intra-database setting, using the background improves performance when using image quality features. However, in contrast to the intradatabase setting, using the background deteriorates the performance when using dynamic texture descriptors. This is expected as in the inter-database setting, there exist differ- ent backgrounds between the train and test samples which adversely affect the performance. The best performing one-class system in this case is SVM1+IMQ(w) (the one-class SVM operating on the image quality features extracted from the whole image) with an average performance of 70.23%. In comparison, the best performing two-class system is LDA2+IMQ(w) (the two-class LDA operating on image quality features extracted from the whole image) with an average performance of 69.38%. It can be concluded that the image quality features in the challenging conditions of inter-database and crosstype evaluations are more robust as compared with the dynamic texture descriptors. More importantly, the one-class anomaly-based systems are not inferior compared with twoclass alternatives.
Discussion
A number of comments regarding the key findings are in order.
• In terms of representations, we have examined three different dynamic texture descriptors and quality-based features. In the intra-database setting, the BSIF-TOP representation achieved the best performance among other representations both in the one-class and twoclass systems. However, in the more challenging conditions of inter-database evaluation, the image quality features proved to be more robust than the dynamic texture descriptors.
• Regarding the use of background information, in the intra-database evaluation, the performance of both one-class and two-class systems using either one of the four different representations improved. However, in the inter-database setting, the use of background deteriorated the performances of systems operating on dynamic texture descriptors. The image quality features, however, in the inter-database setting could benefit from background information.
• The anomaly detection-based systems in both intraand inter-database settings are not inferior as compared with the two-class alternatives. As we have only examined outlier detection systems based on a one-class SVM and a sparse representation model, it would be beneficial to study other anomaly detection approaches.
• In this paper we examined the effectiveness of oneclass SVM trained on positive samples only. While it is quite unrealistic to assume that spoofing attacks samples are abundantly available, in a real scenario there will be attempts at spoofing and samples will become progressively available over time. It would be interesting to investigate the merit of using these sparse negative samples to refine the one-class SVM solution as suggested by Tax and Duin in [25] .
• The effects of additional normal data and subject specific training are to be investigated. • The anomaly detection approach considered in this work may be extended to the domain anomaly concept proposed in [13] . In this case, one may examine the quality of the data before making a decision. In this respect, if the quality of the test data is very different from those of training, the decision may not be very reliable and system disables the anomaly detection mechanism.
• It can be concluded that neither the two-class systems nor the one-class approaches perform well enough and more research should be conducted to enhance current systems.
Conclusions
Motivated by different observations such as the diversity of spoofing attacks, any new means of spoofing attackers may invent (previously unseen by the system), the problem of imaging sensor inter-operability and other environmental factors in addition to the small sample size in the face spoofing problem, a number of propositions are put forth. In terms of conceptual innovations, a new and more realistic formulation of the spoofing detection problem based on the anomaly detection concept was proposed. In addition, a new evaluation protocol to take into account unseen attack types was proposed. Finally, a thorough evaluation and comparison of 20 different one-class and two-class systems based on common spatio-temporal as well as image quality features was performed. It was demonstrated that the anomaly-based formulation is not inferior as compared with the conventional two-class approach.
